THE MILITARY STRATEGY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
I chapter. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The Lithuanian Armed Forces (hereinafter – the “LAF”) are an integral part of the state and society, contributing to the implementation of national interests and objectives by carrying out the tasks assigned to them. Following the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, laws and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, the LAF protect and defend the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state as well as contribute to international security and stability. In case of war, Lithuania is defended by the war-time Armed Forces, with the LAF constituting the main part of them.

2. The LAF have a double responsibility. First of all, they are responsible for the defence of Lithuania. However, as a member of NATO and the EU, Lithuania is also responsible for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, and must be capable of responding to international security challenges together with its Allies.

3. The aim of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – the “Military Strategy”) is to establish the ways of using the LAF to implement national security and defence policy objectives and to respond to the threats to national security.

4. The Military Strategy establishes the military objectives of Lithuania, the means of implementing these objectives, and the requirements for the LAF and the war-time Armed Forces. The Military Strategy serves as a foundation for the development of the national defence system and implementation of the national security objectives in the context of armed defence.

5. Implementation of the Military Strategy is based on the fundamental principle of the democratic civilian control of the armed forces whereby the decisions regarding the defence policy of Lithuania, development and use of military capabilities are made by the democratically elected civilian government.

6. This Military Strategy replaces the Military Strategy approved in 2012, and is based on the provisions of the Law on the Basics of National Security, the Law on Armed Defence and Resistance to Aggression, and other laws, as well as on the provisions of the National Security Strategy, and takes into account the NATO Strategic Concept, the EU Treaty of Lisbon, and the EU Security Strategy, as well as the assessments of the threats to the national security.

II chapter. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

7. The security of Lithuania is guaranteed by its membership in NATO and the military presence of the United States in Europe and the region, whereas the membership in the EU provides additional security guarantees. Both in their southern and eastern neighbourhoods, NATO and the EU are facing a number of long-term challenges which have a direct and indirect impact on the security of Lithuania. The actions of Russia are undermining the rule-based European security architecture, and constitute the main factor diminishing the security of Lithuania. As a result, the security environment of Lithuania has worsened and become less predictable in the long run:
7.1. Russia’s growing military power and decisions to use it in violation of international norms and commitments, on which the security architecture in Europe is based, have the most negative impact on the security environment of Lithuania. Russia’s military buildup, regular snap exercises lacking transparency, and increasing military activity along the borders of Lithuania and other countries intensify tensions in the region and elevate the risk of various military incidents. Russia’s ability to use civilian tools in concert with military instruments, as well as execute covert military operations changes the premises for defence planning in the Baltic Sea region.

7.2. NATO has been reacting to the changes in international security environment, and has been enhancing its readiness to rapidly respond to threats to the security of the Allies. More emphasis on the collective defence dimension and strong transatlantic relations ensure the effectiveness of the Alliance in an ever-changing security environment. Taking into consideration the challenges posed by Russia, NATO focuses on the development of collective defence capabilities, such as very high readiness deployable forces. The Alliance implements a number of security strengthening measures, enhancing its readiness to respond to hybrid threats, establishing new command and control elements, and improving effectiveness of early warning and decision making mechanisms. NATO continues to reinforce its crisis management capabilities and improve its readiness to respond to cyber threats and energy security challenges. The NATO “open-door policy” and development of cooperation with other international organisations and partner states, as well as strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic and international security by conducting diverse international operations, remain some of the key activities of the Alliance.

7.3. Close bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with the United States, Baltic and Nordic states, Poland and other Allies directly strengthens the security of Lithuania, contributes to the development of collective defence capabilities, military presence of the United States and other Allies in the region, as well as increases visibility of their activity, and improves the interoperability of the military capabilities and readiness to respond in case of a crisis. The commitment of the United States to guarantee the security of the region and concrete measures of fulfilling this commitment are the key factors of the security of Lithuania.

7.4. Lithuania actively contributes to the efforts of the international community to strengthen the capabilities of Ukraine’s defence and security sector, and support the ongoing reforms and peaceful conflict resolution. Defence cooperation with the Eastern European, South Caucasian, and Central Asian countries contribute to a more secure environment and promotion of democratic values and regional cooperation.

7.5. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU established clauses of mutual assistance and solidarity in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (hereinafter – the “EU CSDP”). These principles express solidarity of EU Member States in case of an armed aggression against any EU Member State. This provision of the Treaty of Lisbon contributes to the strengthening of the security of Lithuania. A considerable share of the EU CSDP activities is focused on the security challenges in the EU neighbourhood. To this end, the EU civilian and military capabilities are developed and used in conflict prevention, defence capacity building, crisis management and other international operations within both the immediate and distant EU neighbourhoods.
7.6. Through its participation in the activities of the UN, OSCE, and other international organisations, Lithuania contributes to strengthening of global and regional security, which in turn enhances its own security. The UN is the only international organisation focused on global security, while the OSCE plays a significant role in resolving conflicts, combating terrorism, addressing energy and cyber security challenges, as well as promoting confidence and security building measures among the participating states.

III chapter. RISKS, DANGERS, THREATS

8. Recent trends in conflicts show that conventional military instruments can be used with the non-military tools to exploit vulnerabilities of states. Given these circumstances, the LAF must be ready to respond to the following risks, dangers, and threats:

8.1. conventional military threats. The likelihood of a conventional armed aggression against Lithuania and/or other NATO states in the region is no longer a theoretical one, and it may increase due to Russia’s growing military power and intentions to use it.

8.2. irregular military formations. Irregular military formations might be used to destabilize a NATO country or test the unity and credibility of the Alliance. The likelihood of employing covert military methods against an Ally depends on the vulnerability of individual Allies and both their and NATO readiness to respond in a proper and timely manner.

8.3. regional crises. States outside the boundaries of NATO and the EU, whose governments and institutions are incapable of resisting the outside pressure, ensuring effective territorial control and security of their citizens, as well as addressing social and economic problems, remain the most conflict-prone. Conflicts in these states are difficult to localise and have a negative impact on both regional and global security, as they cause humanitarian crises and mass migration, foster organised crime, terrorism and piracy, and hamper the supply of strategically important resources.

8.4. information attacks. Russia and some other states and non-state actors have been aggressively disseminating unfounded and misleading information with an aim to shape Lithuania’s public opinion on national security. Such attacks are used to generate distrust and discontent with the democratic order and the national defence system, discredit the Alliance, its capabilities and commitment to defend the Allies, as well as weaken the unity among the citizens, undermine their patriotism, and the will to defend the country. The spread of information and communications technologies is likely to cause even more information attacks, especially those directed towards specific target groups, in the future.

8.5. activities of foreign intelligence services. The threat of the activities of foreign intelligence services, directed both against the international organisations whose member Lithuania is and against Lithuania itself, is constantly growing, especially the extent of cyber espionage. The aim of these activities is to obtain classified information and negatively affect the military capabilities, political system, and socio-economic life of Lithuania. Due to the increased military activity of NATO in Lithuania and in the region, this threat is likely to intensify in the future.
8.6. **cyber attacks.** Due to a rapid progress in modern information and communications technologies, the cyberspace has become a new domain for conflicts. Lithuania is increasingly dependent on modern information and communications technologies, therefore, certain states and non-state actors will seek to employ cyber attacks more frequently, posing a significant threat to national security. It is very likely that cyber capabilities would be extensively used during any type of conventional or unconventional conflict in the region.

8.7. **energy security challenges.** Interrupted energy supply, disruption of critical energy infrastructure, dependence on a certain type of fuel and on one or several energy suppliers may pose a threat to a successful implementation of the LAF tasks as well as cause new armed conflicts. Due to limited energy resources and intensifying competition for them among states, the importance of energy security challenges will not decline.

8.8. **terrorism.** Terrorism poses a significant threat to the security of NATO, the EU, and a wider international community. Europe is facing an increasing threat of terrorist attacks organised by the EU citizens returning from fighting within radical Islamist groups in other regions, or lone-wolves, affected by the radical propaganda. Despite the low level of a terrorist threat in Lithuania, the possibility of its change cannot be dismissed. Moreover, Lithuanian citizens or military personnel participating in international operations may be affected by terrorist attacks in other countries.

8.9. **natural and industrial disasters.** Natural and environmental disasters or industrial accidents may destabilise the state as well as regional security. Although these threats are not military by nature, they can affect the local population and have long-term negative consequences for the socio-economic life. The likelihood of such threats and the extent of their outcomes are difficult to predict, but Lithuania must be ready to handle them using both civilian and military means.

IV chapter. **DEFENCE POLICY PRINCIPLES**

9. Military objectives of Lithuania and ways of implementing them are based on the following fundamental principles of the defence policy:

9.1. **DEFENCE OF LITHUANIA IS TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL.** The total defence entails that Lithuania is defended by the national armed forces as well as those of NATO Allies, that all national resources are mobilised for national defence, and that every citizen of Lithuania and the entire nation will resist in every way defined as legitimate by international law. Defence of Lithuania is not subject to any conditions, and no one can inhibit the right of the nation and every citizen to resist an aggressor, invader or anyone else threatening the independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of Lithuania.

9.2. **SECURITY OF LITHUANIA IS BASED ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE.** Lithuania must develop military capabilities for both individual and collective defence. At the same time, NATO membership guarantees that in case of an attack, Lithuania will be defended by the armed forces of other NATO nations.

9.3. **SECURITY OF THE ALLIES IS INDIVISIBLE.** Defence policy of Lithuania is based on the principle that a threat to the security of a single Ally is a threat to the security of the whole Alli-
ance. In the spirit of solidarity, the Allies contribute to strengthening the security of Lithuania, and Lithuania is ready to fulfil its commitments to the Allies.

9.4. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY. Because of the changing nature of threats, a successful use of military measures is an essential, but insufficient condition in ensuring the national security. Interoperability of military and civilian capabilities, and close cooperation between the LAF and other state institutions constitute the crucial factor of national security of Lithuania.

V chapter. MILITARY OBJECTIVES

10. In order to implement the goal of the national security policy established by the Law on the Basics of National Security, as well as to protect the vital and primary interests of the national security as defined in the National Security Strategy, and in line with the defence policy principles, the following military objectives are set:

10.1. ensure credible deterrence together with the Allies;
10.2. if deterrence fails, defend Lithuania individually and together with the Allies, and contribute to the defence of the Allies in case of aggression against them;
10.3. contribute to regional and international security and stability;
10.4. contribute to the security of the state in peacetime.

VI chapter. IMPLEMENTATION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES

11. The LAF together with other state institutions must be ready to prevent potential threats, and if prevention fails – to respond to them. To implement the military objectives, the LAF must be trained and employed as defined in the Military Strategy.

12. CREDIBLE DETERRENCE. The aim of deterrence is to convince a potential aggressor that its military actions against Lithuania will fail and result in heavy losses. Credible deterrence is based on the aggressor’s understanding that Lithuania is ready and able to successfully defend itself with the combined efforts of its Armed Forces and citizens, as well as the Allies. Credible deterrence requires:

12.1. developing forces that are capable of performing individual and collective defence of Lithuania and contributing to the collective defence of other Allies, as well as forming a reserve to reinforce regular forces, and developing a modern mobilisation system;
12.2. developing a Host Nation Support (hereinafter – the “HNS”) system to enable fast and smooth deployment and movement of the Allied forces in the territory of Lithuania;
12.3. preparing citizens for state defence and nonviolent resistance. Fostering their will and resilience to information attacks, as well as ability to engage in a total resistance to an aggressor by enabling the citizens to acquire and improve skills for armed state defence and nonviolent resistance. Citizens that are motivated and prepared to defend the state will make a potential aggressor understand that in case of an attack, it will face the resistance of the whole nation;
12.4. ensuring permanent presence of the Allied forces and military equipment both in Lithuania and in the region, conducting national, NATO and other international exercises, joint combat training of the LAF units and the Allied forces deployed in Lithuania, as well as joint operation planning, improving readiness to host reinforcing NATO forces, contributing to the strengthening of collective defence capabilities of the Alliance, participating in NATO projects and multilateral capability development initiatives, and supporting the Alliance’s deterrence policy and the principle of solidarity which expresses the collective will of the Allies to defend from an armed attack;

12.5. developing intelligence capabilities that would allow the assessment of security threats in a timely and precise manner.

13. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE. If deterrence fails, the LAF must defend the independence, territorial integrity, and the constitutional order of the state individually and together with the Allies:

13.1. in the event of individual defence of Lithuania, the LAF will eliminate the aggressor’s forces and neutralise its non-conventional attacks by employing all means of defence available to them;

13.2. in the event of collective defence of Lithuania together with the Allies, the LAF units will participate in joint military actions. A well-developed HNS system will ensure smooth deployment of NATO forces and provision of the host nation support to reinforcing forces;

13.3. by supporting the Allies in case of an attack, the LAF will fulfil the collective defence obligations of Lithuania as a NATO member.

14. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. In order to contribute to regional and international security, the LAF will be used:

14.1. to support NATO-led operations of different types and intensity by performing both combat and non-combat tasks, to support multinational coalitions addressing security challenges outside the Euro-Atlantic area, to support the EU, UN and OSCE-led operations and missions focused on conflict prevention and stabilising the situation in conflict regions;

14.2. to implement international agreements related to conventional arms control and non-proliferation of certain weapons, as well as the security and confidence-building measures;

14.3. to promote bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with the United States, the Baltic and Nordic states, Poland, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and other Allies, in developing military capabilities together and increasing the interoperability of the LAF and the Allied forces;

14.4. to develop bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with countries in the Eastern neighbourhood in order to support their defence and security sector reforms, development of local defence capabilities, and encourage closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community in strengthening the international security.

15. PEACETIME TASKS. Due to the changing nature of threats, the LAF and other state institutions must be ready to respond both to military and non-military threats and emergencies occurring in the state in peacetime. To ensure the national security, well-being of the society, and assist state or municipal institutions, the LAF must develop capabilities to:

15.1. effectively cooperate with intelligence services. Effective and well-coordinated intelligence activities facilitate identification of a possible crisis at an early stage and allow employing
measures to prevent the spreading of the crisis. Close cooperation with the Lithuanian intelligence institutions enables a secure exchange of necessary information and faster neutralisation of threats of various nature;

15.2. conduct limited-scope military operations in case of an armed incident of local nature or violation of state border that do not amount to armed aggression, in coordination with state and municipal institutions;

15.3. in case of emergencies, provide assistance to state and municipal institutions if capabilities of these institutions are insufficient.

VII chapter. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES

16. Only modern, motivated, well-trained and educated armed forces, consisting of manoeuvrable, easily deployable and sustainable regular military units, and reinforced by the prepared reserve, are able to ensure individual national defence until reinforcement from the Allies has been provided, and successfully contribute to collective defence and other military operations. To achieve these aims, it is necessary to allocate adequate defence funding and develop military capabilities that are required to implement the military objectives. The LAF are subject to the following requirements:

16.1. REQUIREMENTS FOR CAPABILITIES:

16.1.1. Ability to act independently. The security of Lithuania as a member of the Alliance is based on the NATO collective defence guarantees. However, in case of an armed attack against Lithuania, the LAF must be ready for individual defence until reinforcement from the Allies has been provided;

16.1.2. Ability to rapidly shift to the wartime structure. In order to ensure effective preparation and rapid response to aggression, the peacetime structure of the LAF must be similar to that of the wartime;

16.1.3. Ability to rapidly respond to threats. The LAF must maintain high readiness units prepared to rapidly respond to both conventional military threats and peacetime armed incidents or state border violations, as well as support state and municipal institutions if needed;

16.1.4. Prepared reserve. In addition to regular forces and active reserve, Lithuania must develop a sufficient, properly trained and equipped reserve which meets the needs of national defence;

16.1.5. Ability to act together with the Allies. The LAF must be prepared to operate with the Allied forces in order to be ready to participate in collective defence and international operations;

16.1.6. Readiness to act together with civilian institutions. To effectively respond to modern threats, the LAF must be ready to act in concert with national civilian institutions, therefore, the interoperability of the LAF and civilian state and municipal institutions must be enhanced;

16.1.7. Interoperability of military and civilian capabilities in international operations. Military and civilian capabilities are often employed together in international operations, therefore, the LAF must be ready to implement objectives within an international operation in coordination with different civilian organisations and capabilities of other countries;
16.1.8. **Readiness to participate in full-spectrum operations.** The LAF must be prepared to participate in high-intensity combat operations, as well as international operations aimed at conflict prevention, peacekeeping, stabilisation of a conflict-affected country and/or region, and provision of humanitarian aid;

16.1.9. **Effective command and control.** Mobile and up-to-date command, control, and communications systems of the LAF have to enable uninterrupted and reliable command of the LAF, effective cyber defence as well as coordinated interaction with the forces of NATO and the EU members;

16.1.10. **Ability to execute joint operations.** Success of modern military operations depends substantially on the ability of the military units assigned to different military forces to act together, therefore, different branches of the LAF must be trained to perform joint operations under the control of a single operational commander;

16.1.11. **Sustainability and survivability.** Units of the LAF must be able to maintain the required military capability and independently provide logistic support for as long as necessary to implement the operational tasks. The LAF units must have the necessary protective equipment to mitigate or eliminate the impact of hostile enemy actions, as well as negative effects of natural environment and weapons of mass destruction;

16.1.12. **Host nation support.** The LAF must be able to provide host nation support to the Allied forces deployed in Lithuania, as well as to the incoming Allied reinforcement;

16.1.13. **Deployability.** The LAF must be able to deploy military units into the theatre of operation outside Lithuania by land, strategic air and/or sea transport within a certain time-frame;

16.1.14. **Effective ensuring of energy sources in military operations.** The ability of the LAF to perform the tasks assigned to them is highly dependent on the uninterrupted supply of energy resources. In this context, the means of energy supply have to be identified in planning of military operations. Energy resources have to be used efficiently as long as it does not reduce the combat power of the LAF.

16.2. **REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL:**

16.2.1. **Leadership.** Leadership is crucial in motivating the troops to perform the tasks and maintaining their morale in difficult combat situations. Therefore, the LAF must educate professional leaders, who are capable of managing their subordinates, striving for continuous improvement, and able to perform military tasks assigned to them;

16.2.2. **Motivation, initiative, and fighting spirit.** Military personnel must be trained and educated to be motivated, proactive, and capable of acting independently under extreme combat conditions. Lithuanian troops must be characterised by such a fighting spirit, unity, and patriotism that they would never lose their motivation and be committed to their nation and the state;

16.2.3. **Ability to act in a multinational and multicultural environment.** In order to successfully implement collective defence and other military operations, the LAF personnel must be ready to work in international military structures and act in a multinational and multicultural environment. Therefore, the LAF personnel must be knowledgeable of the principles and procedures of interoperability of military forces and be able to cooperate with representatives from different cultural backgrounds.
VIII chapter. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WAR-TIME ARMED FORCES

17. In case of aggression, the war-time armed forces consisting of the LAF as well as other forces assigned to them by laws would defend Lithuania. With regard to this, the war-time armed forces are subject to the following requirements:

17.1. **Combat training and interoperability.** The mandatory requirements for interoperability and combat training are established by the Chief of Defence of the Republic of Lithuania to ensure the readiness of the war-time armed forces;

17.2. **Ability to respond to aggression immediately.** In case of aggression, unit commanders of the war-time armed forces must be ready to act immediately in accordance with the advance defence plans. The Chief of Defence is responsible for the development of these plans in peacetime and performs the functions of the Commander of the war-time armed forces in the state of war;

17.3. **Ability to act together with the Allies.** In case of aggression, only well-trained war-time armed forces, capable of acting together with the Allied forces, can ensure credible national defence.

IX chapter. FINAL PROVISIONS

18. NATO membership offers Lithuania protection against threats from which Lithuania could neither defend itself alone, nor resist for long on its own. However, it does not exempt Lithuania from the responsibility to develop capabilities of the LAF for both national defence and defence of the Alliance. NATO’s capacity depends on the collective implementation of defence commitments by its members and on the efforts of every Ally to strengthen its security and ability to defend itself from an armed attack.

19. Strong, well-trained, and equipped LAF, loyal to the state and its citizens, is paramount to the national security and independence of Lithuania. Lithuania is building forces that are capable of implementing national defence tasks and those of the Alliance individually and in cooperation with the Allies, as well as participating in crisis management operations and contributing to the security initiatives of other international organisations.

20. The Military Strategy is a flexible and open document which is revised regularly in case of fundamental changes in the security environment.